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STATEMENT OF THE c,.;sE
Nature of the Case
in these consolidated appeals, Justin Ryan Moss appea,s from the district
court's orde;-s revoking his probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and from
the district court's order revoking his probation and ordering his sentence
executed without reduction in Docket No. 38541.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Moss opened a U.S. Bank checking account in March 2005.
1

pp.456-57.")

(PSI,

After Moss failed to deposit any money into the account and

incurred negative balances, the bank "forcibly closed" the account in February
2006. (PSI, p.457.) A little more than two months later, on April 22, 2006, Moss
wrote a check on the closed account, payable to Idaho River Sports, in the
amount $5,330.31. (PSI, pp.456-57, 488.)
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38600 with issuing a check without
funds. (#38600 R., pp.26-27.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Moss pied guilty
and the state agreed to recommend probation. (#38600 R., p.43.) The district
court accepted Moss' plea, entered an order withholding judgment, and placed
Moss on probation for three years. (#38600 R., pp.44-53.)
While still on probation in Docket No. 38600, Moss fraudulently obtained
Cheryl Unruh's financial transaction card number and used it to make payments
toward the rental of a desktop computer and plasma television from Central

1

Citations to page numbers of the PSI correspond to the page numbers of the
electronic fiie "MossPS!.pdf."
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Rent-to-Own.

(PSI, pp.383-84, 396-403.)

In total, "six payments totaling

$450.72 were charged to Ms. Unruh's card." (PSI, p.383.)
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38590 with grand theft. (#38590
R., pp.30-31.) The state also filed a motion for probation violation in Docket No.
38600. (#38600 R., pp.76-77.) Pursuant to the state's motion, the cases were
consolidated for purposes of plea and sentencing. (#38600 R., pp.84-86.) Moss
thereafter pied guilty to grand theft in Docket No. 38590 and admitted to having
violated his probation in Docket No. 38600. (#38590 R., pp.34-35; #38600 R.,
pp.87-88.)

In Docket No. 38600, the district court revoked Moss' withheld

judgment and probation, imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one
and one-half year fixed, but suspended the sentence and reinstated Moss on
probation for three years.

(#38600 R., pp.89-94; #38590 R., pp.36-37.) In

Docket No. 38590, the court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Moss on probation for 10
years with the condition that he serve 120 days in jail. (#38590 R., pp.36-37, 4956; #38600 R., pp.89-90.)

The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

(#38590 R., p.50.)
Moss was released from jail on December 22, 2008. (#38600 R., p.101;
#38590 R., p.61.) In January 2009, Moss' grandmother reported to police that
Moss had forged her signature on several student loan applications. (PSI, pp.2,
26-34, 276-81.)
loans in 2007.

Moss had asked his grandmother to co-sign on two student
(PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.)

Moss' grandmother considered doing so

but, after reviewing the repayment schedule and consulting with Moss' father,

2

she told Moss she would r.ot co-si:;;-i on the :oa:1s

(PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.)

'.n

January 2009, despite having never persona'.iy co-signed on any student loan
application, Moss' grandmother received a collection notice from American
Education Services (AES) attempting to collect past due payments for two
student loans in rv1oss' name.

(PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.)

Moss' grandmother

requested and received copies of the student loan applications from AES and
discovered that Moss had forged her signature as a co-signer on the
applications.

(PS!, pp.2, 26, 276.) The loans were for $10,000 and $14,000,

respectively. (PSI, pp.26-27, 276-77.) Upon receiving the student loan checks
made payable to Moss and his grandmother, Moss forged his grandmother's
endorsement on the back of the checks so that he could cash them. (PSI, pp.2,
26-27, 276-77; 6/30/09 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13, L.12.)

Moss also forged his

grandmother's name on a third student loan application, for $18,000, but the
money was never disbursed. (PSI, p.281.)
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38541 with five counts of forgery.
(#38541 R., pp.33-35.)

The state also filed motions for probation violation in

Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600. (#38600 R., pp.102-04; #38590 R., pp.62-64.)
In Docket No. 38541, Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery, and the state
dismissed the remaining counts and also dismissed a separate case in which
Moss was charged with four counts of issuing insufficient funds checks between
January and Ma,ch 2009.

(#38541 R., pp.57-58; 6/30/09 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.2,

L.11.) Moss also admitted to having violated his probation in Docket Nos. 38590
and 38600. (#38600 R., pp.124-25; #38590 R., pp.86-87.) !n Docket No. 38541,
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the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with five
years fixed, and retalned j

1 R, pp.59-60, 65-69.) In Docket
court revoked Moss' probation, ordered

Nos. 38590 and 38600,

jurisdiction.

and
R., pp.86-90.) At the end of

(#38600 R, pp.124-28; #38590

retained jurisdiction period, the district courts

suspended Moss' sentences in all three cases and placed him on probation - for
10 years in Docket No. 38541, for nine years in Docket No. 38590, and for one
year in Docket No. 38600.
#38590

1 R., pp.73-74, 77-84; #38600 R., pp.131-40;

, pp.91 100.)

Approximately four months later, in June 2010, the state filed motions for
probation violation in all three cases, alleging, inter alia, that Moss changed
residences without permission, left his assigned district without permission, failed
to report to his probation officer as instructed, and absconded supervision.
(#38600 R, pp.141-43; #38590

, pp.101-03; #38541 R., pp.90-94.) After an

evidentiary hearing in Docket No. 38541, the district court found that Moss had
violated his probation by changing residences without permission, leaving his
assigned district without permission, failing to report to his probation officer, and
absconding supervision. (#38541 R., pp.111-14, 118-19; 2/1/11 Tr., p.62, L.2
p.64, L.8.) The district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered his sentences
executed without reduction.

(#38541 R., pp.115-16, 120-23.)

Thereafter, in

Docket Nos. 38600 and 38590, the district court also found Moss in violation of
his probation and, consistent with Moss' request that it do so, it revoked Moss'
probation and ordered his underlying sentences executed. (#38600 R., pp.180-

4

34; #38590 R., pp.140-44; §e~ 3/2/i 1 Tr., p.57. L.13 - p.59, L.2, p.60, l.25 p.61, L.9 (Moss stipulating to the "im;:)Ositon of his underlying sentence").)

Moss filed notices of appeal, timely from the district courts' orders
revoking his probation in all three cases. (#38600 R., pp.185-88; #38590 R.,
pp.147-50; #38541 R., pp.125--28.) By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the
cases have been consolidated for appeal. (See #38590 R., pp.2-3.)

5

ISSUES

1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Moss due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with
requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Moss' probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to
reduce Mr. Moss' unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed, in docket number 38541, upon revoking his
probation?

(Appellant's brief,

5.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Moss failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Is Moss precluded by the doctrine of invited error from challenging the
district court's decision to revoke his probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and
38600?

3.

Has Moss failed to establish that the district court abused its dlscretion,
either by revoking his probation, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for
reduction of sentence in Docket No. 38541?

6

ARGUrviENT

L
Moss Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Su rer:1e Cou1i Violated His
Den in His Motion To Au ment The A ellate Record
VVith lrrelevant Transcripts

A

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Moss fiied a motion to augment

with as-yet unprepared transcripts of various district court hearings heid between
one and two years before the district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered
his sentences executed in February 2011 (Docket No. 38541) and March 2011
(Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600), respectively.

2

(Motion To Augment And To

Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed July 15,
2011 (hereinafter "Motion To Augment").) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the

motion, stating as its reason therefor that "there is no showing that the
[requested transcripts] contain material relevant to any issue in the above
entitled appeal."

(Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend The

Briefing Schedule, filed August 15, 2011.)
Moss now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-

2

Moss filed a timely objection to the record in the district court (see Objection To
The Record, filed June 22, 2011 ), but he withdrew that objection to pursue a
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court whether the requested transcripts
were necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal (see Order Granting
Motion To Withdraw Objection To The Record And Vacate Hearing, filed July 7,
2011; Motion To Augment, p.2).

7

15.) Moss has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, however,
because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court
has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Moss Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentations
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state,
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112
n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations

8

;:;mitted)); Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the
record is :iot sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from ihe
record prejudiced h:s ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 !daho 615,
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Moss "must present something more than
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v.
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Moss has failed to carry this burden.
Moss' appeal is timely only from the district court's February 10, 2011
Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and Commitment in Docket No.
38541, and from the district court's March 3, 2011 Order[sJ of Revocation of
Probation, imposition of Sentence and Commitment in Docket Nos. 28590 and
38600.

(See #38541 R., p.120 (order revoking probation, filed February 10,

2011), p.125 (notice of appeal, filed February 16, 2011); #38590 R., p.142 (order
revoking probation, filed March 3, 2011), p.147 (notice of appeal, filed March 7,
2011 ); #38600 R., p.182 (order revoking probation, filed March 3, 2011 ), p.185
(notice of appeal, filed March 7, 2011 ).)

He argues that the Idaho Supreme

Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his motion to
augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the
following proceedings: (1) an unidentified "hearing" held on February 9, 2010, in
Docket No. 38541; (2) a probation violation hearing held on September 3, 2009,
in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600; (3) a disposition hearing heid on September
17, 2009, in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600; and (4) a jurisdictional review

hearing held on February 11, 2010, in al! three cases.

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

Moss has failed to explain, much less demonstrate, however, how transcripts of
hearings held between one and two years before the decisions at issue in this
case are necessary to decide the only issues over which this Court has
jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that the district court judges had
the requested transcripts when they revoked Moss' probation in February and
March 2011, or that they relied upon anything said at the previous hearings as a
basis for their decisions to revoke Moss' probation and order execution of his
sentences. Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to
the lower courts in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, they were
never part of the records before the district courts in considering whether to
revoke Moss' probation and are not properly considered for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the
appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and 'will not
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v.
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of
this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). In
short, Moss has failed to show how the requested transcripts are relevant to any
issue arising from the revocation of probation and the execution of his
sentences, the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct App. 2009), relied on by Moss
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(Appe!;ant's brief, ~1 .12), ihat a;'.}pe!late "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into
execution following a period of probation" is based ·'upon the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed as \Net! as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Contrary to Moss' apparer,t claim
on appeal, however, Hanington does not stand for the proposition that a merits-

based review of a decision to revoke probation and order a sentence executed
requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of every
hearing over which the trial court presided.

To the contrary, the law is well

established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior
hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its
decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to transcription at public
expense of every hearing conducted before the date probation was finally
revoked.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not

"required to expend

its funds

unnecessarily" where "part or al! of the

stenographic transcript . . . will not be germane to consideration of the appeal"
(citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 (''(T]he fact
that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by unnecessarily
including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the State must
waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate
review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 (indigent
appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to transcription at
public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was presented).

11

Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of
probation, Moss has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here.
Moss has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that what
happened at the 2009 and 2010 hearings was considered or played any role in
the courts' decisions in February and March 2011 to revoke Moss' probation and
order his sentences executed.

As such, Moss has failed to show that such

transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Moss claims that he
Is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief,
p.11.)

He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the

constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must
provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he
desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are
unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.8; see also p.6 ("The only way a
court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested
transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").)
No reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kl at

190. The appellate court denied his request for

12

a trial transcript at gove,:1,:1ent expense en the !::asis of a 1cical ruie providing that
verbatim transcripts of triai proceedi:igs \Nou!d be ;Yovided at government
expense only for felonies.

lct.: at

191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitied to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

lg_,_ at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue ~n Draper v. Vvashington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." .lst_ at 195.
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

kl

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. lg_,_ at
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. _!_c;L at 194-95. See also
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether

13

requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the revocation of Moss'
probation and the execution of his sentences, without reduction, in February and
March 2011. The record related to the district courts' decisions to revoke Moss'
probation and order his sentences executed without reduction is already
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district courts is before
the appellate court. (Se~ generally, PSI; #38541 2/1/11 Tr. (evidentiary hearing);
#38541 2/2/8/11 Tr. (disposition hearing); #38590 and #38600 3/2/11 Tr.
(disposition hearing).)

It is Moss' appellate burden to establish that the

requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to
review the orders revoking his probation.

The augmentations he sought,

however, were of never before prepared transcripts of hearings held between
one and two years before the district courts rendered the decisions that are at
issue in this case.

Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested

transcripts or anything contained therein were before the district courts in relation
to the probation revocation proceedings.

Because Moss failed to make a

showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts, there
is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district courts
is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Moss

14

has failed to establish a vioiatic:·1 of his due process rights.

3

Strand, 137 Idaho at

463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Moss has also failed to establ:sh that denial of his reqL!est to augment the
record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. Moss
cites to several cases where crlminal defendants were denied appellate records
because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing,~. Griffin v.

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. VVashinqton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record that in
any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Moss' request for
transcripts solely because he is indigent.

In fact, Moss' motion would have

properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.AR. 30. Moss' motion
to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon
all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even helpful in
addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied
the motion to augment because Moss failed to make a showing that any
appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as

3

As a component of his due process claim, Moss argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Moss has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial
of the motion to augment has deprived Moss of effective assistance of counsel
on this appeal.
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requested.

There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment would

have been granted had Moss been paying for the requested transcripts; the rule
applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Moss has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
record amply demonstrates that Moss' motion to augment was properly denied
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for
adequate review of the district courts' decisions to revoke Moss' probation and
order execution of his sentences.

Because Moss has failed to show his due

process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by the
denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief.

11.
Moss Is Precluded By The Doctrine Of Invited Error From Challenging The
Revocation Of Probation In Docket Nos. 38590 And 38600
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose
of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985

P .2d 117, 120 (1999). "One may not complain of errors one has consented to or
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109 ,daho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. L~e, i31 idahc 600,
605, 961 P.2d 'i 203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). The invited en-or doctrine applies to
sentencing decisions, as well as to rulings made durin;i trial. State v. Leyva, 117
idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation and ordering his sentences executed in Docket Nos. 38590 and
38600. (Appellant's brief, pp.3, 15-20.) As acknowledged by Moss on appeal,
however (see Appellant's brief, p.3 n.2), Moss stipulated at the disposition
hearing to the revocation of his probation and the "imposition of his underlying
sentence[s]" in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and, in fact, specifically asked the
district court to order his underlying sentences executed (#38600 3/2/11 Tr.,
p.57, L.13 - p.59, L.2, p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.9). Because Moss specifically asked
the court to revoke his probation and order his underlying sentences executed,
Moss is precluded by the invited error doctrine from complaining on appeal that
the district court abused its discretion by doing so.

111.
Moss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion In Docket No. 38541

A

Introduction
After Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery in Docket No. 38541, the

district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with five years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(#38541 R., pp.59-60, 65-69.)

Following the

period of retained ]urisdiction, the district court placed Moss on probation
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(#38541 R., pp.73-74, 77-84), which Moss violated almost immediately by
absconding supervision (#38541 R., pp.90-94, 111-14, 118-19). Concluding that
Moss was "not a candidate for probation" and that the sentences originally
imposed were necessary to protect society and to deter Moss and impress upon
him the seriousness of his criminal conduct (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.6), the
district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered his underlying sentences
executed without reduction (#38541 R., pp.115-16, 120-23; 2/8/11 Tr., p.49,
Ls.4-10).
On appeal, Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation because the probation violations that were aileged and
which he was found to have committed did not involve the commission of any
new crimes and because, he contends, "there are mitigating factors present" that
militate against the revocation of probation.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-20.)

He

also contends that the court abused its discretion by declining to reduce his
underlying sentences, citing the same "mitigating factors" he claims militated
against the revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-22.)

None of

Moss' arguments establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).
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!\foss Has Failed To Establish ThEJ The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Revoking His Probation And Orderinq H~s Sentence
Executed Vvithout Reduction
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
i25 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason.

lfL

'The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. VVilson, '127 Idaho
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society."

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho

525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). Any cause satisfactory to the court,
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation.

Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99.

Contrary to Moss'

assertions on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court's
determination that Moss' probation was no longer achieving the goal of
rehabilitation nor consistent with the protection of society under the facts of this
case.
Moss has repeatedly demonstrated himself incapable of or unwilling to
comply with the law and the terms of probation. While on probation for issuing a
check without funds in Docket No. 38600, r.foss stoie someone else's credit card
number and used it to make payments on 'r-No luxury items - a computer and a
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flat screen plasma television.

(PSI, pp.383-84, 396-403.)

Despite having

committed this new crime, Moss was continued on probation in Docket No.
38600 and was also placed on probation after pleading to grand theft in Docket
No. 38590. (#38600 R., pp.89-94; #38590 R., pp.49-56.) As a condition of his
probation in Docket No. 38590, Moss was required to serve 120 days in jail,
during which time he was to participate in and complete substance abuse
treatment and behavioral change programming

(#38590 R., p.51.)

Moss

completed the required programming and was released from jail in December
2008. (#38590 R., pp.57-61.) One month later, law enforcement learned that
Moss had forged his grandmother's signature on three student loan applications
and two student loan checks, resulting in the payment to Moss of over $25,000 in
fraudulently obtained student loan funds.

(PSI, pp.2, 26-34, 276-81.)

While

investigating the forgeries, law enforcement discovered that Moss had also
written numerous insufficfent funds checks between January and March 2009.
(PSI, pp.151-62.)
After Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery in Docket No. 38541 and
admitted to having violated his probation in Docket Nos. 38600 and 38590, the
district courts retained jurisdiction in all three cases.

(#38541 R., pp.65-69;

#38600 R., pp.124-28; #38590 R., pp.86-90.) Following the period of retained
jurisdiction, Moss was given yet another opportunity to prove himself amenable
to community supervision. (#38541 R., pp.77-84; #38600 R., pp.131-40; #38590
R., pp.91-100.) On February 18, 2010, six days after the district court entered its

order placing Moss on probation in Docket No. 38541, Moss attended a
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V/ithin days of the orientat!on, Moss moved to California, without

contacting his probation officer and without otherwise seeking perm;ssion to do
so. (PSi, pp.6O3-O4; 2/1/11 Tr., p.16, L.5 - p.25, L.19.) Moss' probation officer
attempted numerous times to contact Moss but was unsuccessful. (PS!, p.6O4;
2/1/11 Tr., p.16, L.5- p.17, L.14.) When he finally did talk to Moss on April 15,
2010, he ordered Moss to return to Idaho and to report personally to the
Department of Probation and Parole on April 26, 2010. (PSI, p.6O5; 2/1/11 Tr.,
p.25, L.25 - p.26, L 13.) Moss failed to do so and did not return to Idaho until he
was arrested on a bench warrant in November 2010. (2/1 /11 Tr., p.26, Ls.12-23,
p.27, Ls.1-7, p.38, L.13 - p.39, L.3.)
In deciding to revoke Moss' probation, the district court specifically
considered the nature of Moss' probation violations and whether continuing Moss
on probation was consistent either with Moss' rehabilitation or the protection of
society. (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.1O.) Noting that it had taken a chance on
Moss originally (presumably in light of Moss' prior criminal record and his history
of violating probation), the district court concluded that, assuming Moss was ever
a candidate for probation, that was no longer the case. (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.619.) The court was understandably troubled by the fact that, almost immediate!y
after being placed on probation following the period of retained jurisdiction. Moss
moved to California without permission and willfully failed to make himself
available for SU;Jervision.

(2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.10-16.)
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The court also fo~nd

incredible Moss' claims that he had verbal permission from some unnamed
probation official to move to California (2/1/11 Tr., p.62, L.12 - p.64, L.2), and it
characterized Moss as "but loosely acquainted with the truth" (2/8/11 Tr., p.48,
Ls. 15-16).

Given Moss' history of theft-related offenses, his demonstrated

inability or unwillingness to comply with the terms of every probation he has been
granted and, more specifically, his demonstrated inability to comply with the
conditions of his probation in the instant case that required him to avail himself of
supervision, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that
probation was neither achieving the goal of rehabilitation nor consistent with the
protection of society.
On appeal, Moss concedes that he violated the terms of his probation.
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) He argues, however, that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his probation because his probation violations did not
involve the commission of any new crimes. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Moss'
argument fails to show an abuse of discretion for at least two reasons. First, it
ignores the fact that Moss has been afforded numerous opportunities for
probation in numerous cases and, on each occasion, Moss has proven himself
unabte to comply with the conditions of probation, whether it be refraining from
committing new crimes or, as in this case, availing himself of supervision.
Second, although the state did not allege any new crimes as the basis for its
motion to revoke Moss' probation, this does not ipso facto mean, as Moss
contends, that "Moss' probation was not threatening society." (Appellant's brief,
p.17.) Moss has a history of writing bad checks and stealing from others for his
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own financial gain.

By ab;;ccnding sc.1pervlslor1, Moss deprived the probation

department and the cou:i of the abi!ity to rnonitor his activities to ensure that he
did not revert to his manipulative and deceitful behavior.
Moss also contends that there are other mitigating factors that militated
against the revocation of his probation. Specifically, his cites his mental health
issues, family support, education and employment, and "troubled childhood" as
reasons that the district court shou,d have continued him on probation.
(Appellant's brief, pp.17-20.) information with respect to ail of these facts was
before the court, both at the time it imposed sentence and when it revoked Moss'
probation. That the district court did not place greater mitigating weight on these
factors, or elevate them above the need to protect society from Moss' unyielding
propensity to take advantage of and manipulate others and the system, does not
establish an abuse of discretion.

The district court specifically considered the

fact that Moss had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and his claims that he
was not on his medication when he committed the underlying crimes (2/8/11 Tr.,
o.42, L.19 - p.43, L.5), but it rejected this as a basis to continue Moss on
probation, concluding that, "medicine or not," Moss had demonstrated himself to
be "not suitable for probation" (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.10-19). Even assuming the
truth of Moss' assertion on appeal that his bipolar disorder contributed to his
commission of the underlying offenses, such does not excuse Moss' multiple
failures to abide by the terms of his probation after Moss received prescriptions
for, but failed to take, medication to resolve his mental health issues.
2/8/11 Tr., p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.3.)
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(Se~

The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Moss was no longer an appropriate candidate for community
supervision.

This conclusion is supported by Moss' history of theft-related

offenses, the risk he presents to the community, and his demonstrated inability
to comply with the terms of probation. Given any reasonable view of the facts,
Moss has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

D.

Moss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Declining To Reduce His Sentence Upon Revoking
Probation
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original

sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State

v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's
decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.

Those standards require an

appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment."

State v.

Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are:
"( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before
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and after tl:e original judgment," i.e_, ''facts zxis.ti0g when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurTing between the o6gtna! sentencing and the
revocation of probation,'' Haninaton, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 P_3d at 8.
Citing the same factors he claims militated against the revocation of his
probation, Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
reduce the unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, originally imposed
upon his convictions for forgery in Docket No_ 38541 _ (Appellant's brief, pp.2022.) For the reasons already set forth in section IILC., supra, and incorporated
herein by reference, Moss has failed to show that he was entitled to a reduction
of hrs sentence. Moss has failed to show an abuse of discret:on.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and its order
revoking probation and ordering Moss' sentence executed without reduction in
Docket No. 38541.

DATED this 11

th

day of April 2012.

LORI A. FLEM!f\lG
Deputy Attorney'General
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